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Abstract 
The idea of symmetric stability of symmetric equilibria is introduced which is relevant, e.g., for the 
comparative-statics of symmetric equilibria with symmetric shocks. I show that symmetric stabil-
ity can be expressed in a two-player reduced-form version of the N-player game, derive an ele-
mentary relation between symmetric stability and the existence of exactly one symmetric equili-
brium, and apply symmetric stability to a two-dimensional N-player contest. 
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1. Introduction 
In this note I develop the idea of symmetric stability of symmetric equilibria in symmetric N-player games. With 
symmetric equilibria it is reasonable to consider dynamics where the set of trajectories is restricted by symme-
tric initial conditions. This is particularly relevant when studying the comparative-statics of symmetric equilibria 
to a common shock, such as changing the prize in a contest or a tax parameter in the Cournot model, since this 
has symmetric effects on symmetric players both in terms of the initial displacement and the subsequent adjust-
ment process. Symmetric stability conditions can be expressed in terms of a best-reply function obtained by fix-
ing the strategies of all other players to the same action. Given a k-dimensional strategy space, this reduces the 
dimensionality of the stability problem from Nk to k, while retaining all relevant information about symmetric 
equilibria and their symmetric stability. By means of this reduced form I prove that the existence of a single 
symmetric equilibrium is the same formal property as global symmetric stability in regular one-dimensional 
games, independent of the number of players. Further, stability under symmetric adjustments implies the exis-
tence of only one symmetric equilibrium for any finite-dimensional strategy space, and symmetric stability pro-
vides a meaningful restriction for the possible comparative-static patterns of symmetric equilibria. All results are 
independent of the possible existence of asymmetric equilibria, and the practical usefulness of symmetric stabil-
ity is briefly illustrated by means of a two-dimensional N-player contest. 
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2. Symmetric Games 
I consider games of 2N ≥  players. ( ) ( )1, ,g g gkx x x S k≡ ∈  is a strategy of player g, where ( ) 1ki iS S k S=≡ = ×   
with 0,i iS S = ⊂   , 0iS > , and interior ( )iInt S . All players have identical strategy space. The payoff of g  
is represented by a 2C  function ( ) ( )1, , , , ,g g N g gx x x x x−Π ≡ Π  , which is strongly quasiconcave1 in gx . 
In a symmetric game all players have identical payoff function in the sense that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, , , , , , , ,gg g N g Nx x x x x xσ σ σ σΠ = Π     
for any permutation σ  of { }1, , N . With the above assumptions, player g’s best-reply function 
( ) ( )gg gx xϕ ϕ− −≡  is continuous, and differentiable at interior points. Given the focus on symmetric equilibria 
one can restrict attention to a reduced-form problem by picking an indicative player ( 1g = ), and requiring all  
opponents to play the same strategies, i.e. ( )1 , ,x x x− =  , x S∈ . Let ( ) ( )1 1 1, ,x x x x−Π ≡ Π  with correspond- 
ing best-reply ( ) ( )1x xϕ ϕ −≡  and derivative ( )xϕ∂  . Any symmetric equilibrium *x  is identifiable by its 
first projection *1x S∈ , 
*x  is a symmetric equilibrium if ( )* *1 1x xϕ=  , a symmetric equilibrium always exists 
and the set of symmetric equilibria is compact [1]. 
2.1. Symmetric Stability 
I mostly restrict attention to the system of gradient dynamics2 
( ) , 1jj jx S x j N= ∇ Π ≤ ≤                                (1) 
where S is a k k×  positive-diagonal adjustment matrix, and ( ) ( )
j
j
j
j
x
x
x
∂Π
∇ Π =
∂
. A solution to (1) has the  
form ( ) ( )( )1j j Nx t x t ≤ ≤= , where ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , ,j j jkx t x t x t=   is the trajectory of j. I consider a restricted version 
of this trajectory map, where initial values ( )0x  are symmetric, i.e. ( ) ( )1 0 0Nx x= = . Then, by symmetry, 
( )jx t  is the same for all players and solves  
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1 1 1
1
,
, where
x x
x x
x S x x
x
=
∂Π
= ∇Π ∇Π ≡
∂
 
                      (2) 
I say that an interior symmetric equilibrium *x  is symmetrically stable if the dynamics induced by (2) con-
verge to *x  whenever ( )0x  is close to *x .3 Hence:  
Definition 1 (Symmetric stability) The symmetric equilibrium ( )*x Int S∈  is symmetrically stable if all 
eigenvalues of ( )*1Jˆ x , the Jacobian corresponding to (2), have negative real parts.  
*x  is symmetrically unstable if at least one eigenvalue of ( )*1Jˆ x  has positive real part. Stability of (1) im-
plies symmetric stability, but not vice-versa (see Figure 1). Let ( ){ }1 1: 0sCr x S x= ∈ ∇Π = , and note that  
( )1 : kx S∇Π →  , ( )1 1x x∇Π  is a 1C -vector field with k k×  Jacobian ( )1J x . A symmetric game is  
(symmetrically) regular if i) ∇Π  has only regular zeroes4 and ii) ∇Π  points inwards at the boundary of S. 
Any future reference to a regular game means “symmetrically” regular, which is a weaker condition than general 
regularity of a symmetric game (see [2]). The first theorem below reveals the general connection between sym-
metric stability and the existence of a single symmetric equilibrium, depending on the dimensionality of the 
strategy space. Its proof exploits an essential relation between Jˆ , J  and ϕ .  
Lemma 1 For ( )1x Int S∈ :  
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1Jˆ x SJ x S I xϕ= = − ∂                              (3) 
 
 
1Meaning: 1z z⋅ = , ( ) ( )
2
0 0
g g
g g g
x x
z z z
x x x
∂Π ∂ Π
⋅ = ⇒ ⋅ <
∂ ∂ ∂
 (see [1]).  
2This is a standard dynamics, see e.g. [3]-[5].  
3Equivalently, *x  is symmetrically stable if the dynamics (1) converge to *x  for any symmetric starting point close enough to *x .  
4 ( )( )1 1 0sx Cr Det J x∈ ⇒ ≠ . 
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Figure 1. Stable (left) and only symmetrically stable (right).                                          
 
Proof: The first equality is immediate. Next, decompose ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1
1
, ,
x x x x
x x x x
J x
x x
= =
∂∇Π ∂∇Π
= +
∂ ∂
 
 . By the 
Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
, ,
x x x x
x x x x
x
x x
ϕ
−
= =
 ∂∇Π ∂∇Π ∂ =
 ∂ ∂
 
 
  which, together with the de-
composition of J  gives the second equality.   
 
Let ( ) ( )11
1
x
x
x
α
αβ
β
∂∇ Π
Π ≡
∂

 , 1 , kα β≤ ≤ , where a∇ Π  is the α-th projection of ∇Π .  
Theorem 1 (i) If 1k =  then *x  is a symmetrically stable equilibrium if ( )*11 1 0xΠ <  or equivalently if  
( )*1 1xϕ′ < .  
(ii) For 2k =  a symmetric equilibrium *x  is symmetrically stable if ( )*1J x−   has only positive principal 
minors.  
(iii) If 1k ≥  and a regular games has multiple symmetric equilibria, then there is at least one symmetrically 
unstable equilibrium.  
Proof: (i) Follows from lemma 1. (ii) Let 1 2,λ λ  be the eigenvalues of ( )*1Jˆ x , and 1 2, 0s s >  be the diagon- 
al entries of S. Lemma 1 and the condition in (ii) imply ( )( ) ( ) ( )* * *1 2 1 1 11 1 2 22 1ˆ 0Trace J x s x s xλ λ+ = = Π + Π <   and  
( )( ) ( )( )*1 2 1 1 2 1ˆ 0Det J x s s Det J xλ λ = = > . Hence 1 2,λ λ  have negative real parts. (iii) Follows from applying 
the Index theorem to the symmetric gradient field ∇Π .5 The index of a zero of ∇Π  is 1+  if  
( )( )1 0Det J x− >  and 1−  if ( )( )1 0Det J x− < . With multiple symmetric equilibria a symmetric equilibrium  
with 1−  index exists, and ( )( )*1 0Det J x− < . By lemma 1 ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1ˆ kDet J x s s Det J x− = ⋅ −  , hence  
( )( )*1ˆ 0Det J x− < , which implies existence of at least one eigenvalue with negative real part.   
It follows from (iii) that if each 1
sx Cr∈  verifies symmetric stability then exactly one symmetric equili-
brium exists.6 In the one-dimensional case an even stronger relation between symmetric stability and the number 
of symmetric equilibria applies:7 
Corollary 1 Let 1k =  in a regular game. There exists an odd number of symmetrically stable equilibria. 
 
 
5See [5].  
6If all eigenvalues of ( )1Jˆ x  have negative real parts, then ( )( )1ˆ 0Det J x− >  and by (3) also ( )( )1 0Det J x− > . Thus every 1 sx Cr∈  
has index 1+ , which by the index theorem implies existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium. This type of relation between the index of 
certain vector fields and stability conditions is known in other settings (see [6] and the references therein).  
7The claims in corollary 1 are generally restricted to 1k = .  
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Moreover, a symmetric equilibrium is globally symmetrically stable if *x  is the only symmetric equilibrium.  
Proof: Given regularity, a zero of ( )*1x∇Π  is symmetrically stable if ( )*1 1xϕ′ < . Hence symmetrically sta- 
ble equilibria have index 1+  and the first claim follows from the Index theorem. Necessity in the second claim 
is trivial. For sufficiency, note that uniqueness of *1x  implies ( )*1 0J x <  (the corresponding index is 1+ ). 
From (3) deduce that ( )*1 1xϕ′ < . Hence ( )xϕ  crosses the 45˚-line from above. Thus ( )x xϕ >  whenever  
*
1x x< . Let 
*
1x x< . Because ( )( ), 0x xϕ∇Π =  it follows from ( )x xϕ >  and strong quasicon-cavity that  
( ) ( ), 0x x x∇Π = ∇Π > . Hence ( )1 0x t >  whenever ( ) *1 1x t x<  (Figure 2). Similarly, ( )1 0x t <  whenever 
( ) *1 1x t x> .   
It may be noted from the above proof (or Figure 2) that the second claim of corollary 1 remains valid if there 
is a single symmetric equilibrium which belongs to the boundary ( *1x S∈∂ ). 
Best-reply dynamics. Another standard dynamics in the literature are dynamics defined directly over the 
best-reply functions.8 These dynamics are of the form  
( )( ) , 1j j jx S x x j Nϕ −= − ≤ ≤  
and the symmetric restriction analogously to (2) yields  
( )( )1 1x S x xϕ= −                                    (4) 
A symmetric equilibrium *x  is symmetrically stable with respect to (4) if the Jacobian, ( ) ( )( )1 1J x S I xϕ= − −

   
has only eigenvalues with negative real parts. It follows that corollary 1 and theorem 1 (i) and (iii) apply, with-
out modification, to the dynamics (4). The latter follows from (3) and the proof of theorem 1, and the former can 
be deduced directly from (4) together with Figure 2.9 
Relation to comparative statics. Typically, the IFT is the main formal tool to (locally) sign the comparative- 
static effects.10 Stability conditions allow to robustly sign comparative-static effects [3] and additionally assure 
local convergence after a small shock, which many deem a natural requirement of a comparative-static predict- 
tion. A symmetrically unstable equilibrium is not re-established after a symmetric shock. Moreover, symmetri- 
 
 
Figure 2. Corollary 1.                                                                       
 
 
8See e.g. [5] [7]-[9].  
9It can be noted occasionally from the figure that strong quasiconcavity is generally indispensable for corollary 1 to apply with the gradient 
dynamics, but not with (4).  
10A well-known exception is supermodular games (see [5]).  
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cally unstable equilibria may “pervert” the comparative-statics. To illustrate consider a regular game with three 
symmetric equilibria ( ) ( ) ( ), ,A B Cx c x c x c  (see Figure 3) where c is an exogenous common parameter. A and 
B are symmetrically stable (index 1+ ), but C is symmetrically unstable (index 1− ). Consider a symmetric pa-
rameter shift c c′→  and assume that ( ) ( ), ,x c x cϕ ϕ′ >  . As is suggested by the figure (formally  
apply the IFT) points A and B both increase to A′  and B′ . As both A′  and B′  are symmetrically stable, the 
symmetric dynamics (2) converge from A to A′  or from B to B′ , consistent with the suggested shift of ϕ . 
For the symmetrically unstable point C we see that C C′ <  (a consequence of the negative index), contradict-  
ing the direction suggested by ( ) ( ), ,x c x cϕ ϕ′ >  . As C lies in the basin of attraction of B′  the dynamics do  
not move down to C′  but monotonically up to B′  (which is also inconsistent with “small” changes). Hence 
the comparative-statics suggested by the IFT and the dynamics disagree at the unstable equilibria, and the IFT- 
prediction C C′→  could never be supported as a stable equilibrium. 
2.2. Application: Two-Dimensional Contest with Endogenous Price 
To illustrate symmetric stability in an example consider a payoff of the form  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,f p f f V p p C fπΠ = −                          (5) 
The interpretation is that N contestants choose their strategies, the pairs ( ),j jf p , to obtain a prize worth ( )V ⋅ , 
where the value of a prize is endogenously determined. A specific context is provided by [10], where firms com- 
pete in salience and prices for attention-constrained consumers.11 Assume that ( ) ( )0, 0C f C f′ ′′> ≤  and 
( ), 0f fπ >  (everybody has a chance to seize a prize) for 0f > , and ( ), 0V p p >  (a prize is worthwhile 
seizing) for 0p > . An interior symmetric equilibrium ( ), 0p f >  solves  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
, , 0
, , 0
f f V p p
f f V p p C f
π
π
=
′− =
 
with associated Jacobian  
 
 
Figure 3. Symmetric stability and comparative statics.                                                
 
 
11Payoff (5) is compatible with multiple prizes.  
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( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
,
, 0
,
, ,
, ,
pp pf
pf ff
V p p
f f
p
J p f
V p p f f
f f V p p C f
p f
π
π
π
∂ 
  Π Π ∂ = =    Π Π ∂ ∂  ′′ − ∂ ∂ 
 

 
 
It easily follows from theorem 1 (ii) that ( ),p f  is symmetrically stable if both , 0pp ffΠ Π <  . By contrast, 
with dynamics (1) we would need to evaluate the eigenvalues of a Nk Nk×  matrix. The symmetric stability 
condition states that second-order direct effects of each own strategy ,p f  (which must be negative by strong  
quasiconcavity) are not reversed by the second-order effects of ( ),p f , a property which is typically satisfied 
in standard functional examples (see [7]). Moreover, it follows from theorem 1 (iii) that if any ( ), sp f Cr∈  
verifies this condition and the game is symmetrically regular, a single symmetric and symmetrically stable equi-
librium exists. 
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